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INTRODUCTION
While a long-standing literature analyses cross-country variation in the incidence of child poverty in rich countries at a point in time (see Cornia and Danziger 1997; Vleminckx and Smeeding 2001; UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre 2012) , less is known about child poverty dynamics -children's individual movements into and out of low household income over a period of time. Yet to understand the causes and consequences of monetary child poverty and to design effective anti-poverty policies, it matters if the same group of children remain poor or if every child experiences one brief poverty spell. Adverse consequences of experiencing poverty are well documented and the length of time spent in poverty amplifies its negative impact on key child outcomes (see Brooks-Gunn and Duncan 1997) , including cognitive and behavioural development.
However, cross-country comparative studies of children's transitions in and out of low income across the enlarged European Union (EU) are sorely lacking. A recent comprehensive review of income mobility in the European Union by Van Kerm and Pi Alperin (2013) does not focus on children. Although several studies analyse child poverty dynamics in single countries (e.g. Ashworth et al. 1994 for the United States (US); Ayllón 2015a for Spain; for the United Kingdom (UK) Bradshaw and Holmes 2010; Cantó and Mercader-Prats 2002; Jenkins and Schluter 2003 for Germany and the UK), cross-country studies of child poverty transitions are rare (Duncan et al. 1993; Bradbury et al. 2001 ). Yet a cross-national perspective provides reference points for national results. It also helps explore the effects of varied policy environments or, at the very least, formulate relevant questions about policy effects (see Valletta 2006 ).
The present study aims to address these research gaps, using longitudinal data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The analysis focuses on both income mobility and child poverty dynamics in the EU during the recent economic crisis. The study analyses the extent of mobility along deciles of the income distribution, investigates if income growth among children has been pro-poor and if income mobility may have offset income inequality among children. The study then goes on to analyse transitions in and out of income poverty as well as the associated effects of household-level income, employment and demographic events in 20 EU countries, using relative country-specific poverty lines anchored in the pre-crisis period (i.e. 2008) . The following section reviews the key literature on income mobility and poverty dynamics. We then describe the data and methods used, present the results and conclude.
RESEARCH ON INCOME MOBILITY AND POVERTY DYNAMICS

Income mobility
To our knowledge there are no cross-country comparative studies that analyse income mobility among children in Europe, although there is growing income mobility literature focusing on adults. In one of the few EU-wide comparative income mobility analyses, Ayala and Sastre (2008) used data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for the period 1993-1997 to compare income mobility in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. Based on a balanced five-year panel in each of the countries, they observe higher income volatility in Spain, Italy and the UK than in Germany and France. Mobility comparisons by Gangl (2005) involved eleven EU countries and the United States. The study found lower levels of income mobility in Germany, Ireland, and the United States than in the Netherlands and Denmark. Remarkably, "low-inequality countries . . . also tend to be the countries exhibiting the lowest degree of persistence in income inequality over time" (Gangl 2005, p. 151) . Germany was an exception, as it combined low inequality with low mobility. These findings are consistent with those of Gregg and Vittori (2009) who examined the mobility in labour earnings of individuals aged 20-64 in Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, also using ECHP data. Longer-term earnings inequality reduction was greatest in Denmark followed by Italy. Germany was the least mobile, with Spain and the UK in between.
What is the relationship between income mobility and income inequality? Riener (2012) investigated the extent to which declines in inequality are directly related to the frequency and magnitude of relative income variations, using ECHP data for 13 European countries. He shows a negative relationship between total relative mobility and long-run income equalization. Higher income mobility does not necessary imply lower inequality. The study also found that higher levels of income transfer, which is defined as redistribution from richer to poorer households, also meant a higher equalization of incomes in the EU-13.
Using longitudinal data for 26 EU countries from the EU-SILC 2003 -2007 , Van Kerm and Pi Alperin (2013 illustrate that newer EU member states experience faster growth in individual incomes than older EU members and that income growth was pro-poor in all countries. They find no evidence that countries with higher (cross-sectional) inequality compensate for it with higher mobility. Hence, the findings suggest that income mobility does not reduce income inequality in the short run.
Aristei and Perugini (2015a) analyse short-term income mobility in 25 European countries and observe a positive relationship between the countries' income mobility and inequality and a negative one between mobility and development levels. Countries have been classified into six groups as they share several important features. Countries with the Social-Democratic regime show low mobility and low inequality. On the contrary, more liberal Anglo-Saxon and Baltic countries present the highest levels of mobility. Continental European countries hold their intermediate position. Mediterranean countries show more varied results, with Spain and Greece approaching the top and Italy and Portugal the bottom tails of income mobility.
Most recently, Aristei and Perugini (2015b) use longitudinal data from the EU-SILC to analyse short-term income mobility prior to and after the economic crisis in 26 European countries focusing on the data sets covering the period 2004-2007 and 2008-2011 . Using the Fields and Ok index, further decomposed into growth and a transfer component, the authors illustrate that 4 years prior to the crisis, income volatility was the highest in the countries of the Baltic region, followed by Poland and Bulgaria. In the remaining countries of Central-Eastern Europe, with the exception of Slovenia, mobility was close to the average of the sample recorded for the Social Democratic countries. In most of the transition countries the growth component largely prevails over the transfer component, reflecting their high growth rates (Aristei and Perugini 2015b, p. 137) . Over the crisis the situation changed. The same countries still illustrate the highest rates of mobility but the rates were lower due to the shrinkage of the growth component. Alves and Martins (2012) analysis in "Mobility and Income Inequality in the European Union" , based on information from the EU-SILC database for the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] illustrate that in all the countries there are sizeable income variations with substantial mobility between the various income deciles. Income mobility is concentrated on transitions between adjacent deciles with the smallest rates of transitions being detected in the lowest and highest deciles of the income distribution. The evidence suggests that lower mobility is linked to the higher age brackets and that the highest mobility, both upwards and downwards, occurs in individuals aged between 20 and 40 years.
Poverty dynamics
In a seminal work on child poverty dynamics, Bradbury et al (2001) analysed movements in and out of low income across seven industrialized countries in the mid-1990s, using data from national longitudinal surveys. The study demonstrated why focusing exclusively on the cross-sectional picture of child poverty incidence may paint a misleading picture of economic disadvantage among children. However, Bradbury et al did not analyse predictors of child poverty transitions except for recording lower poverty exit rates and higher entry rates for children in lone parent families. Yet identifying the key determinants of poverty transitions helps target policies more effectively. For example, if unemployment events are the main driver of transitions into poverty, unemployment benefits need to be more effective in cushioning incomes at times of job loss, but if demographic events (e.g. child birth) are the main triggers of poverty, family benefits and services have to play a larger role.
Following Bane and Ellwood's (1983) pioneering study of non-pensioner household poverty dynamics in the US between 1972 and 1981, the literature tends to distinguish between demographic and economic events as predictors of transitions into and out of poverty. Demographic events concern changes in household needs (i.e. household size and composition) due to births, deaths, divorce/separation, moving out of the parental home, etc., while income events refer to changes in household income components. Bane and Ellwood found that, although income events dominated, the effects of demographic events were non-trivial and for some groups could be particularly large for the risks of entering poverty. A recent analysis of poverty transitions in Europe (Vandecasteele 2011) showed that the poverty-triggering effects of demographic ('life course') events are larger for more disadvantaged social strata. In a study of poverty dynamics among households with children in eight industrialized countries, using national panel surveys, Duncan et al (1993) distinguished between the effects of demographic, employment (i.e. "job gain"; "more work") and social insurance events (i.e. starting/stopping receiving social insurance benefits) and found that employment events were the most important triggers of both poverty entries and exits.
Cross-national studies of poverty dynamics that rely on separate national longitudinal surveys inevitably face challenges to comparability due to different panel lengths (i.e. the number of times/years the same individuals/households are interviewed), measurement of income and other key variables as well as sampling and 'tracing' rules (i.e. on following up individuals who split from their original households). The introduction of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) in 1994, which covered the then EU member states and used harmonised data collection procedures in all of them, made highly comparable cross-country analysis of poverty dynamics possible, but the panel completed in 2001. Data from the ECHP were extensively used to analyse crosscountry differences in poverty dynamics, but not specifically among children. Fouarge and Layte (2005) studied welfare regime variation in household-based recurrent and persistent poverty rates, Layte and Whelan (2002) examined cross-country differences in the effects of household-level events on poverty transitions, Callens and Croux (2009) analysed predictors of poverty transitions separately for adult men and women, while Mendola et al (2009) and, more recently, Ayllon (2015b) studied poverty persistence among young adults in Europe.
There was no EU-wide longitudinal living conditions survey between 2001 and 2005, when the EU-SILC rolled out. However, as a four-year rotational panel it has a much shorter observation period than the ECHP. Although it is suited to studying short-term poverty transitions, it is less useful for the analysis of longer-term trajectories in recurrent or persistent poverty (European Commission 2012, p. 164) . As a first study to include the new EU member states, Polin and Raitano (2014) used the EU-SILC 2005 -2007 to analyse the effects of demographic and economic events on poverty transitions in six groups of countries (by region/welfare regime). Consistently with the literature, they found that economic events dominated, but demographic triggers were important to poverty entries. Andriopoulou and Tsakloglou (2015) used both the ECHP 1994 and the EU-SILC 2005 -2008 to analyse the effects of employment, income (i.e. changes in earnings) and demographic events on adults' movements in and out of poverty in all EU countries that had valid data. They found that changes in labour earnings of the household head is a consistent predictor of poverty transitions in all countries, but more so in the Mediterranean ones; employment events matter more for poverty exits than entries; and demographic events are somewhat more important in Scandinavian countries.
The present study builds on and contributes to the comparative literature on poverty dynamics in a number of ways. First, it uses children, rather than adults or households, as units of analysis. Second, it uses cross-country comparable data from the longitudinal EU-SILC 2008-2013 for a diverse sample of 20 EU countries. Third, it focuses on the effects of employment, income and demographic transitions on poverty entry and exit in a multivariate regression framework and analyses their relative importance in different countries. We expect that employment income events dominate in all countries, but more so in Eastern and Southern European countries with less comprehensive social protection systems. Demographic events are not likely to bear much weight because of their rarer occurrence in a short observation period. To our knowledge, ours is the first longitudinal analysis of the effects of household-level events on child poverty transitions in the enlarged EU during the economic crisis and the ensuing period of slow recovery and austerity.
DATA AND METHODS
Data
We use panel data from the EU-SILC -a large-scale household-based living conditions survey covering all EU member states. It is a four-year rotational panel with one-fourth of the sample replaced every year. See Iacovou and Lynn (2013) for more details about the EU-SILC rules for following individuals and households from one wave to the next. Individuals who move out of the Innocenti Working Paper 2016-16 original household are not always followed up and the extent to which they are varies across countries. Thus, our analysis of associations between demographic and poverty transitions needs to be interpreted with caution.
The analysis of income mobility is based on data from the following four rotations of the EU-SILC: 2006-2009, 2008-2011, 2009-2012 and 2010-2013 . The earliest panel represents the conditions just before the start of the global economic crisis, while the three most recent panels overlap with the crisis. We then use data from the latest panel only, i.e. 2010-2013, to analyse child poverty transitions. It captures the situation during the economic crisis. Household income refers to the calendar year preceding the interview for all EU countries except Ireland and the UK, which use contemporary income, but there is no data for the UK in the EU-SILC 2010-2013.
For analysis of income mobility, we use 24 European countries. 1 We distinguish between new and old EU member states based on whether they entered the EU before 2004. We then excluded the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Poland from multivariate analysis of poverty entries because they do not treat employee income consistently (e.g. before or after taxes and contributions) across all respondents and all years under observation. We also excluded Norway because of the low numbers of transitions in and out of poverty. There are thus 20 countries in the multivariate analysis of transitions into poverty, but only three countries have sufficiently large sample sizes (of at least 1,000 observations) for the analysis of child poverty exits: Hungary, Italy and the UK.
Variables
The dependent variable in all our analyses is disposable household income after taxes and transfers adjusted for household size and composition using the 'modified OECD scale'. Income mobility analysis relates to individual income, as each child or adult over 65 years is assigned his or her household's income.
For the analysis of child poverty dynamics, we calculate the relative poverty lines (60% of the national median income) using the nationally representative cross-sectional EU-SILC 2008, then inflate the 2008 poverty lines using harmonised consumer prices indices published by Eurostat and apply them to the 2010-2013 longitudinal data to construct poverty indicators. In other words, we 'anchor' the poverty lines in 2008. Although we re-do the analysis using 'floating' relative poverty lines based on contemporary national median incomes as a robustness check, we focus on anchored poverty because it is consistent with our income mobility analysis which is done in real, rather than nominal, terms. Moreover, since the studied period of 2010-2013 covers the economic crisis and the ensuing spell of slow and uneven recovery, when median incomes stagnated or fell in many countries, fixing the poverty line in a pre-crisis survey year (2008) allows for a more consistent comparison of living conditions over time. Thus we keep the goal posts fixed rather than moving them around.
To model transitions into and out of poverty, we are mainly interested in the effects of employment, income and demographic events. We define employment events as changes in the number of employed individuals aged 16 or over (i.e. interviewed as adults in the EU-SILC) between any two consecutive waves, t and t+1. Using the self-reported economic status item, we define 'work' as any employment or self-employment (whether part-time or full-time) and construct a variable with the following mutually exclusive categories: "same number of adults in work as last year" , "fewer adults in work" , "more adults in work" , "still a jobless household" and "no longer a jobless household" .
Thus the first three categories refer to households where at least one adult is in work at time t and the last two categories refer to jobless households (where nobody reports employment or self-employment) at time t.
We define income events as changes in total employee income aggregated across household members and divided by the 'equivalent' household size. Employee income is recorded in the EU-SILC as either net, gross or anything in between (e.g. net of social security contributions but not of taxes). As long as employee income is treated the same way within the same country across all years under observation, it does not matter whether it is net or gross because we look at relative per cent changes in employee income between two consecutive years. We excluded the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Poland from multivariate analysis of poverty transitions due to inconsistencies in the treatment of employee income. Relative changes in equivalent employee income within 5 per cent are coded as "no change" , while decreases (increases) in employee income in excess of 5 per cent are coded as decreases (increases) in non-zero employee income. Households with zero employment income in both years are coded as having "no employee income" , while those that had zero income at time t and any positive employment income at time t+1 are coded as having an "increase from zero employee income" .
We control for two types of demographic events, both very rare in the four-year panel: changes in the number of children under 18 and transitions to and from lone parenthood. The vast majority of households have the same number of children in any two consecutive waves. Increases in the number of children are driven by new births rather than children moving in, while decreases in the number of children are due to 17-year-olds 'ageing out' from the child sample by turning 18. Most of these children remain in the same household but are no longer included as units of analysis in the estimation of child poverty transitions. We also control for whether a household has three or more children under 18 ("large family") at time t.
Lone parent households are those that contain one or more lone parent family unit. The vast majority contain just one lone parent unit. Following Chzhen and Bradshaw (2012) , lone parents are individuals with their own (biological/adopted/step) children in the household but without a co-resident partner, as well as single adults living with children under 18 in the household who are not their own (e.g. grandparents with children under 18). Very few individuals make a transition to lone parenthood (through partnership dissolution or a birth/adoption without a partner) during the observation period, but some make a transition from a lone parent to couple family by having a partner move in.
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Finally, we control for the highest level of completed education per household and for the number of years 'at risk' of making a transition into (out of) poverty. The latter is meant to control for the length of time spent in poverty but the observation period is too short for it to make a substantial difference.
Both household disposable income and employee income refer to the same income reference period, which is the calendar year before the interview for all countries included here except the UK. Since the rest of the covariates are measured at the time of the interview, to avoid a mismatch between the timing of different transitions, we carry the income variables one way backward (except for the UK). This results in the loss of one wave, reducing the period of observation from the maximum of four years to the maximum of three years in an unbalanced panel.
Methods
Income mobility and inequality
For the analysis of mobility across deciles of the income distribution, we rank the children (or correspondingly adults who are older than 65 years in the base-year) in ascending order of their household incomes and then partition them into ten decile groups for each longitudinal file and country. All incomes are deflated to 2008 prices in the national currencies. Decile boundaries are derived using the nationally representative cross-sectional EU-SILC data sets. For each country, each decile group contains children with incomes corresponding to the decile values from the cross-sectional EU-SILC data set, and we therefore have a comparable definition of income thresholds across all the countries.
To examine income mobility among children in Europe, we pool children from all the countries together, although the income decile to which they belong is established at the country level. The analysis is conducted on a balanced sample of children followed for 4 years. We use the concept of income mobility as individual income growth (for more information on the measure see Van Kerm and Alperin (2013) ) and calculate the mean relative income growth as per cent increase in mean decile income from the base-year to final year (i.e. over four years). We use the following formula:
Where y0 is the individual income in the base-year and y1 is the income 3 years later. As the incomes have been deflated to 2008 prices, the results illustrate real income growth. The average (mean) is taken for each decile in the base-year. A transition matrix is then used to illustrate changes in the relative positions over a 4-year period.
The paper also uses the Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006) method for inequality decomposition which shows that the change in income inequality between two time periods (expressed in generalised Gini coefficient) could be expressed in terms of two components: progressivity of income growth and a measure of re-ranking. The former is an indicator of how much growth has disproportionately benefited individuals towards the bottom of the distribution in the initial time period. The latter captures how much progressive income growth has led to re-ranking between individuals, so that the net reduction in inequality is the difference between the two. Let G1 and G2 denote the Gini coefficient of subsequently first and second point in time income and C 1 2 denote the concentration coefficient for the first point in time income calculated using second point in time fractional ranks. Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006) show that:
where R = G2 -C 1 2 and V = G1 -C 1 2 V is the measure of the progressivity and R is an index of mobility in the form of re-ranking. In the absence of re-ranking, the reduction in inequality is exclusively determined by the size and progressivity of the income changes illustrated by V. Hence inequality is reduced by pro-poor income growth unless more than offset by concomitant income mobility.
Child poverty dynamics
To analyse children's transitions into and out of poverty, the EU-SILC data are transformed into a 'long format' person-period file so that each row refers to a child i in period t. First, transition matrixes are estimated, separately by country. This shows the raw (transition) probabilities of moving into poverty or remaining non-poor at time t+1 for children in households that are non-poor at time t as well as the probabilities of moving out of poverty as opposed to remaining poor at time t+1 for children in households that are poor at time t. We are particularly interested in those who make a transition into poverty and those who remain in poverty in two consecutive waves. The former indicates the risk of becoming poor during the relatively short observation period, while the latter indicates the persistence 2 of poverty.
Discrete time event history analysis is used to estimate the probability of entering poverty (exiting from poverty) between any two successive sweeps, conditional on being non-poor (poor) at time t, using logistic regression models. The dependent variable in the 'poverty entry' model is a change from poverty status 0 ('non-poor') at time t to poverty status 1 ('poor') at time t+1, and the reverse is the dependent variable in the 'exit' model. In the 'poverty entry' model, for each time period t when a household's equivalent income is above the poverty line and so a resident child is at risk of moving into poverty by the following wave, there is a binary response yit showing whether in the ensuing period the household's income is still above that year's poverty line (0) or below the poverty line (1). The latter denotes a transition into poverty. If the household no longer appears in the study at t+1, yit is set to zero (i.e. it is a 'right-censored' observation). Thus, the transition variable yit is constructed at the level of the household, but only children under 18 are included in the regressions. The last wave when a household is observed is used to construct the transition variables, but is not used in the regression analysis itself.
Since we use an unbalanced panel, households can remain at risk of making a poverty transition for a different number of years. Those that were present in only one wave are all excluded from the analysis because there is no information about their next year's income. Those who are present in only two waves have incomes carried backward from the second wave but there is no information about making a transition by the third wave, so they are also censored (yit = 0 for all of them and, therefore, they drop out from the regression estimation). Only households in the UK can remain in the analysis if they are observed in two waves only. Households with valid information in all four waves can be at risk of moving into or out of poverty for one, two or three waves in the UK and for one or two waves in the rest of the countries.
RESULTS
Household income mobility among children
Figure 1 (page 15) presents household income growth across deciles of the distribution for children under 18 in EU countries for four periods: 2006-2009, 2008-2011, 2009-2012 and 2010-2013 . (Table A1 in the Annex shows the same estimates in non-graphical format). Mean relative income growth rates have been calculated for each base-year decile group. In each period, income growth among children is clearly pro-poor: relative (per cent) income growth is highest in the poorest decile, although the pattern is slightly different for each of the four periods considered. Mean income growth in the poorest decile slowed down over time: it went from 212% between 2008 and 2011 to 122% between 2009 and 2012 and 146% between 2010 and 2013 . It has to be noted that high rates of mean income growth in the bottom decile have to be interpreted with great caution because they are likely to be influenced by the 'regression to the mean' 3 and by the fact that small absolute changes from a very low base appear as large changes in relative terms.
Generally, relative real income growth among children was greater between 2008 and 2011 than between 2009 and 2012 or 2010 and 2013. There is one exception: between 2010 and 2013 income growth in the richest decile was positive (7 per cent) and, therefore, higher than in the other two time periods when it was negative. This shows variation in income growth patterns over the crisis, with relatively higher rates of income growth in the first years of the crisis. The analysis also illustrates that prior to the crisis, relative income growth in households with children was considerably higher in each income decile (see real income growth, 2006-2009 in Figure 1) . Hence, economic crisis had a negative impact on aggregate income growth in households with children in each decile with the exception of the richest decile which, in contrast to previously, showed a positive income growth between 2010 and 2013. Figure A1 in the Annex illustrates the relative income growth for the elderly by decile prior and during the economic crisis. The income growth was pro-poor in each time period considered, with much higher percentage growth before the crisis than during the crisis. The growth rates are declining with each decile. For instance, between 2010 and 2013 the relative income growth among the elderly in the EU was on average 98 per cent of initial income in the poorest decile, 15 per cent in the second decile, 9 per cent in the third decile and falling in the remaining deciles. The average rates of income growth by decile among adults aged over 65 were lower than among children in each time period. -2009; 2008-2011; 2009-2012; 2010-2013. Are there differences between the new and old EU member states? Figures 2 (page 16) and 3 (page 17) illustrate the per cent real income growth in households with children in each income decile for different time periods (see also Tables A2 and A3 in the Annex). The new EU member states show higher income growth than the old EU member states in each income decile with two important exceptions. Income growth in the poorest decile was higher in the old EU member states than in new EU member states in each time period considered over the crisis. However, prior to the crisis aggregate income growth in the poorest decile was higher in the new member than in the old member states, 205 per cent as compared to 142 per cent. This implies that, over the crisis, the incomes of the poorer children were better protected in old EU member states that in new EU member states. Also, in the latest period the mean income growth in the richest decile was higher and positive for old EU member states but not for new EU members states which constantly experienced aggregate income loss in the richest two deciles over the crisis.
It is not always the same children that remain in the bottom and top decile. As the income of the household increases (or alternatively decreases) over time, movement across income deciles takes place. It is of interest to what extent children may be stuck in the bottom end of income distribution and to what extent they move up and down the household income ladder. The mobility process may be represented by the transition matrix. Here, mobility refers to Innocenti Working Paper 2016-16 movements along deciles of the income distribution. Tables 1 (page 17) , 2, 3 (page 18) and 4 (page 19) illustrate transitions across income deciles among children over the following four-year periods: 2006-2009, 2008-2011, 2009-2012 and 2010-2013 . Of those children in the poorest decile, around 50 per cent are also in the poorest decile three years later with less than 1 per cent making it to the richest decile. Of the richest decile, around 60 per cent stay in that group and no more than 2 per cent move into the poorest decile after three years, at the time of the economic crisis. More generally, the most frequent transitions are close to the matrix diagonal. More interestingly, the low income persistence and the probability of staying in the poorest decile prior to the economic downturn (i.e. 2006-2009) was much lower among children, 30 per cent as compared to approximately 50 per cent. Hence, this implies that at the time of global recession, fewer households with children are likely to progress on the income ladder. -2009; 2008-2011; 2009-2012; 2010-2013. How does mobility in the form of re-ranking and income growth impact on income inequality among children? Table 5 (page 19) reports the results of inequality decomposition in order to analyse whether inequality among children was reduced by pro-poor income growth or was offset by concomitant income mobility. The results suggest that prior to the economic crisis inequality among children was declining with the pro-poor growth component being higher than the reranking component. Over the crisis, income inequality among children has increased, with the re-ranking component being higher than pro-poor growth component. The pro-poor growth among children was not enough to successfully lower income inequality among children due to re-ranking. a The transitions have been estimated on a balanced sample of children followed over 4 years. The decile boundaries have been based upon cross sectional EU-SILC datasets. Figure 4 shows poverty transition probabilities across 24 countries between any two consecutive waves over the 2010-2013 period. It plots the probability of moving into poverty for children under 18 who started out as non-poor as well as the probability of remaining in poverty for those who started out as poor. The poverty entry probability ranges from under 2 per cent in Denmark and Norway to just over 10 per cent in Estonia, Iceland, Italy and the UK. Thus, one in 10 children fell into poverty in these countries each year between 2010 and 2013. The probability of remaining in poverty ranges from 31 per cent in Norway to 83 per cent in Portugal. In other words, while 69 per cent of children move out of poverty in Norway each year, only 17 per cent do so in Portugal. Although countries with higher entry rates tend to have lower exit rates (i.e. higher rates of remaining in poverty), there are some exceptions. For instance, Iceland and the UK combine some of the highest exit rates (i.e. one of the lowest rates of remaining in poverty) with some of the highest poverty entry rates in the comparison, suggesting a large degree of mobility in and out of poverty between any two waves over the 2010-2013 period. Countries with high rates of remaining in anchored poverty (i.e. low exit rates) tend to have higher rates of persistent poverty in 2013 ( Figure 5 page 20) . Persistent poverty is defined by Eurostat as remaining in poverty (with household income below 60% of contemporary median income) in the current year and at least two out of three preceding years. Scandinavian countries as well as Austria and the UK tend to have lower rates of persistent poverty and higher exit rates, while Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg and Spain tend to have higher rates of persistent poverty and lower exit rates. Table 6 (pages 21 and 22) shows average marginal effects from country-specific logistic regressions of anchored poverty entry. As expected, income events have by far the largest net effects on the probability of entering poverty for children who are not poor at time t. Everything else being equal, children who live in households with no employee income in both periods (t and t+1) are significantly more likely to be poor in in Austria, Belgium, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, Spain and the UK. The effect is negative in Hungary, but it is small (3 percentage points) and somewhat statistically uncertain (p<0.05). Children living in households that experience a drop in employee income of at least 5 per cent are significantly more likely to enter poverty in all countries except Bulgaria and France, where the effects are not significant. In contrast, there are no significant effects of relative increases in employee income anywhere but in Spain, where, predictably, they reduce the probability of moving into poverty. However, in three countries (Cyprus, Luxembourg and Spain), transitions from no employee income at all to at least some employee income are positively associated with falling into poverty. Although these effects are not very precisely estimated (p<0.05) and there are very few households with zero employee income at time t who are not poor and are still at risk of entering poverty (see Table 7 pages 24 and 25), this suggests that moving into employment, everything else being equal, does not always protect from poverty. Note: persistent child poverty is defined as the percentage of children under 18 whose equivalised disposable household income was below 60% of the national median for the current year and at least 2 out of the preceding 3 years. Source: persistent poverty (Eurostat, last update 09.02.2016); poverty transitions (EU-SILC 2010 , version 01.06.2016 ).
Poverty dynamics
Controlling for income events, employment transitions do not have as much bearing on the risks of entering poverty, with the exception of reductions in employment. Compared to the risk in households where the same number of adults work in both years, children in households where fewer adults work at t+1 are more likely to move into poverty in Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Spain and the UK. Where more adults move into work, the risk of moving into poverty decreases in Belgium, while increasing in Denmark, Iceland and Luxembourg. Meanwhile, remaining in a jobless household is associated with a higher risk of entering poverty in Cyprus, Estonia and Hungary, and with a lower risk in Belgium. Finally, children in households that are no longer jobless by time t+1, i.e. where at least one adult finds work, are significantly more likely to enter poverty in Estonia and Hungary. The more counterintuitive of these findings suggests that not all transitions into paid employment increase disposable household incomes by an amount sufficient to avoid poverty and that the rate of withdrawal of any out-of-work benefits matters too. When the household type changes from lone parent to couple family, the risk of entering poverty decreases in Denmark and Luxembourg but increases in the UK, suggesting that not all partnerships help avoid poverty. Remaining a lone parent in two successive waves increases the risk of poverty entry in Italy but reduces it in the Netherlands.
Children in households with more educated adults have a significantly lower baseline risk of entering poverty in Bulgaria, Hungary, Iceland, Malta and Spain. Table 8 (page 27) shows the results of poverty exit models for selected countries. Only those with sufficiently large samples of children 'at risk' of exiting poverty are included: Hungary, Italy and the UK. Income events are just as important to poverty exits as to poverty entries. In all three countries, increases in employee income (both from zero and non-zero income) between time t and t+1 are associated with significantly higher probabilities of moving out of poverty by t+1, everything else being equal. As expected, employment events also matter. Having an additional adult move into work (for non-jobless households) is associated with significantly higher chances of exiting poverty in Italy and the UK, with no significant effect in Hungary. Remaining a jobless household decreases the chances of moving out of poverty in Hungary and the UK, with no significant effect in Italy.
Although demographic transitions do not appear to influence the risks of moving out of poverty, having three or more children in the household decreases the probability of exiting poverty in Hungary and the UK. Children in households with higher educated adults are significantly more likely to move out of poverty in Hungary, with no significant net effects in Italy or the UK. 
CONCLUSION
The present study is the first analysis of longitudinal data from the EU-SILC to examine income mobility and child poverty dynamics in the EU during the recent economic crisis. It finds that income growth among children has been generally pro-poor but not sufficiently so to put a brake on the increasing income inequality. Relative growth in children's real disposable household incomes was greater before the crisis and in the beginning of the crisis (between 2008 and 2011) than in the later period (between 2009 and 2012, or 2010 and 2013) . However, incomes of the richest decile contracted before the crisis and during its earlier phase but then grew between 2010 and 2013. This illustrates the differential impact of the recent economic crisis along the income distribution: while the lowest incomes were protected, the middle lost a lot of ground and the top did better at the end of the crisis than before the crisis.
There is substantial heterogeneity among the EU-SILC countries in the rates of child poverty entry and exit. Scandinavian countries tend to combine lower exit and entry rates, while Southern and Eastern European countries tend to have higher rates of both exit and entry. Household-level income events, i.e. relative growth in employee earnings, are found to be the most important predictors of transitions into and out of poverty. Children living in households with no income from employment, as well as in households that experience a drop in employee income of at least 5 per cent, are consistently at a high risk of entering poverty. Meanwhile, employment events have less of an impact, except reductions in the number of employed adults, which consistently increases the risk of poverty entries. Demographic events, which are quite rare in the short EU-SILC panel, have little bearing on child poverty transitions in the EU-SILC.
Our results demonstrate that the longitudinal EU-SILC can be used for the study of short-term income mobility and poverty dynamics among children, with several important caveats. First, small country-level sample sizes preclude any detailed analysis of income mobility across deciles of the disposable income distribution for children within countries. Grouping countries by region increases the sample size, but the results can no longer be attributed to specific countries. Second, demographic events are too rare in a four-year rotational panel to make a substantial difference to estimated child poverty transitions, but income and employment events are sufficiently frequent. Moreover, the lack of consistency in 'tracing rules' across countries makes some types of demographic transitions difficult to detect (e.g. young adults leaving parental home). Third, in most countries the sample sizes of children in poverty are not large enough for modelling transitions out of poverty in a multivariate framework, although there are sufficient sample sizes for modelling transitions into poverty. Fourth, a four-year panel is too short for identifying the start of a poverty spell for households who are already poor at the start of the observation period. Finally, the limited type and number of variables recorded in the longitudinal database restrict potential uses of the EU-SILC panel. For example, the 'country of birth' variable collected in the cross-sectional EU-SILC is not present in the longitudinal version. Addressing some of these issues in data collection and harmonisation would considerably improve the value of the EU-SILC to the analysis of income mobility and poverty dynamics. Source: EU-SILC Longitudinal 2006 2008 -2011 2010 . Source: EU-SILC Longitudinal 2006 2008 -2011 2010 . 
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